Understanding continuity in South Korea’s foreign policy

Yoon has left the building - but what happens to his foreign policy ideas? What happens to closer South Korea - U.S. relations, closer South Korea - Japan relations, and closer trilateral relations? What happens to South Korea’s burgeoning relationship with NATO? And let’s not forget the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the “Audacious” plan for North Korea?

They are all but gone. Continuity in foreign policy is not South Korea’s strong spot.

South Korea’s foreign policy is trapped in five-year (okay, let’s say indeterminate) cycles of reinvention. Each new presidential administration, eager to establish its own legacy, discards, rebrands, or reinvents the foreign policy initiatives of its predecessor. The structural features of South Korea’s political system make continuity more the exception than the norm. The causes are well known.

First, South Korea’s constitution limits presidents to a single five-year term. The South Korean Constitution, in Article 70, limits the President to a single five-year term with no possibility of re-election. This provision was established to prevent the concentration of power and ensure a regular transition of leadership. Unlike some countries that allow for multiple terms, consecutive or otherwise, South Korea enforces a strict one-term limit for its presidency.

Second, South Korea’s foreign policy is highly centralized. The South Korean Constitution vests foreign policy power primarily in the President, who serves as the head of state and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. According to Article 66(3), the President represents the Republic of Korea in foreign relations and directs foreign affairs.

Article 73 further grants the President the authority to conclude and ratify treaties and accredit diplomatic representatives, though treaties that are important or require legislative approval—such as mutual security pacts—must be ratified by the National Assembly under Article 60. Arguably, convention and cultural tradition gives a further boost to presidential authority.

Third, the centralization of foreign policy power in the executive, incentivizes short-term, highly personalized foreign policy initiatives. Foreign policy initiatives and diplomatic practices are “owned” by individual senior politically appointed bureaucrats or presidential advisors. When a new president takes office, the diplomatic slate is wiped clean, with new individuals in leadership positions, priorities reset, programs renamed, and sometimes entire ministries reorganized.

Five years is not too long in diplomacy. Just under three years… it’s shorter than an average diplomatic posting.

In South Korea, it takes around one year to prepare the ground for a major diplomatic initiative: concept papers; policy documents; strategic and legislative impact assessments; liaison with diplomatic partners; and communication and promotion - and then the initiatives take off. At the end of a five year term, senior figures within an administration start preparing for the next administration.

Political leaders start looking towards their post-administration politics; senior bureaucrats distance themselves from initiatives (so as to avoid any negative impact); and mid-level bureaucrats, many of whom see the entire process as monotonously consistent, start to slack off and think about opening a fried chicken restaurant.

Foreign policy continuity matters. It enhances a state’s credibility. International partners make decisions based not only on what a state says, but also on how reliably it acts. A government that can demonstrate stable, predictable policies is far more likely to be taken seriously and trusted in sensitive negotiations. Whether the issue is trade, security, or historical reconciliation, continuity helps partners gauge intentions and commitments over time.

Continuity also strengthens policy capacity. Diplomatic initiatives require more than a single term to bear fruit. Programs like multilateral engagement, institution-building, or strategic regional outreach require years—sometimes decades—of sustained effort. When every new administration hits the reset button, it signals to foreign partners that investment in South Korean-led initiatives may not be worth the risk. Diplomatic relationships stagnate, and ambitious agendas falter under the weight of domestic inconsistency.

Continuity also reinforces national role identity. States, like individuals, are guided by role conceptions—how they see themselves, and how they believe others see them. In the case of South Korea, its self-conception as “middle power”, “alliance partner”, or “developmental success” requires consistency. A state that appears erratic or unreliable loses its ability to sustain its identity and fit into global roles that reflect the identity. Without continuity, these identities remain rhetorical rather than operational.

Contrast this with Australia or Canada, where even when governments change, broad foreign policy strategies often remain intact. In those systems, empowered bureaucracies, bipartisan consensus, and longer leadership tenures allow policies to evolve gradually rather than veer off course with each election. The United States, too, until Trump, saw foreign policy anchored by long-term strategic interests that transcended political cycles.

There is no way to change this beyond constitutional reform. Allowing presidents to serve two consecutive terms would immediately improve the timeline for policy development and execution. It would give administrations more room to see initiatives through and create pressure for continuity across terms.

Short of constitutional change, more modest reforms could still make a difference. Strengthening the independent capacity of the foreign policy bureaucracy, for example, would allow civil servants—not just political appointees—to carry institutional knowledge from one administration to the next. Measures such as depoliticizing think tank leadership, reducing the number of political appointments, and increasing training for mid-level diplomats in policy development would help build a more resilient and capable foreign ministry.

Enhancing the legislative branch is another crucial step. South Korea’s National Assembly is currently limited in its foreign policy capacity. By improving the research capacity of its committees—particularly the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee—the legislature could provide consistent scrutiny and support across political transitions. This would add another layer of institutional memory and help prevent abrupt and unconsidered shifts in direction.

Improving the link between foreign policy and the domestic constituency would also help. Public engagement and informed debate are essential for ensuring that major foreign policy decisions have broad support. Without this, each administration remains vulnerable to populist backlash when pursuing controversial policies—especially on sensitive issues like Japan relations, trade liberalization, or North Korea strategy.

So, what will happen to Yoon’s foreign policy ideas? What normally occurs between presidential administrations is a mix of discarding, rebranding, and reinvention.

Initiatives that were highly ideological or were too closely associated with the president, will be discarded. An example would be Yoon’s National Security Strategy. As noted previously, a simple word count on the use of the president’s name in the National Security Strategy highlights its destination. serves as a rough contrast. Yoon is mentioned 121 times (aided by a running footer reminding the reader of the Yoon Administration’s ownership). The U.S. national security strategy mentions Biden just 5 times! The National Security Strategy is toxic and is headed to the trash can.

Specific initiatives within Yoon’s National Security Strategy may be simply rebranded. If an initiative proved successful, was popular with the public, or contributed to national economic development it will be rebranded. Accordingly, closer South Korea - NATO relations that underpins arms sales to European states with a strategic rationale, will be rebranded. It will be part of the next administration’s policy, but will come under a new guise.

Similarly, the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which envisages South Korea playing a more prominent global role will be rebranded with an emphasis suited to the ideology of the next administration - leanings towards “global” if progressives are in power, and leaning towards “Indo-Pacific” if conservatives are in power. Either the way, the same initiatives will be in place.

In the politics of South Korea’s foreign policy, nothing changes in how you play the game, just the names you give it.

Finally, the next administration will also reinvent. Reinvention is saved for areas where there is either strong public backlash or where external events have superseded policy. Reinvention is particularly relevant when it comes to highly controversial issues, such North Korea, Korea - Japan relations, and Korea - U.S. relations.

A prime example would be public opposition to the Sunshine Policy towards the end of the Roh Moo-hyun Administration or opposition to the U.S. at the end of the Lee Myung-bak Administration. Accordingly, Yoon’s “Audacious Initiative” will be discarded and relations with North Korea will be reinvented along an entirely different format.

The mix of discarding, rebranding, and reinvention is a feature of South Korea’s modern foreign policy. However, the political chaos of an attempted coup, impeachment, and tumultuous election may throw a spanner in the works.

While they may have been poorly thought out and implemented, we did not get to see Yoon’s foreign policy initiatives develop beyond their introductory stages. They were not able to bloom, let alone wither on the vine like other administration’s foreign policy initiatives. Unfortunately, this means that the conservative side of politics will remain wedded to the ideologies behind the initiatives - after all, for many conservatives, these policies did not fail - they were stopped.

Given the strategic poverty of Yoon’s foreign policy, it may be lucky that we’re heading towards a progressive administration.